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Abstract
The example of historiography shows that quantitative methods have already been part of the
humanities for a long time. Such methods alone therefore cannot be constitutive of the computational
humanities (CH). It is also problematic and unsustainable to conceive it as a kind of “toolbox” of
quantitative methods, as it places CH outside of the methodological traditions of the humanities
disciplines. Instead, we need to remember that disciplines are defined by their research objects
and the research questions they tackle. This means that we need to distinguish between applied and
theoretical CH, and that applied CH must be firmly placed in the methodological scope and tradition
of their mother disciplines. We posit that the supposed dichotomy of qualitative and quantitative
methods is fallacious: neither will quantitative methods replace qualitative approaches in history,
nor are they unnecessary—they are complementary.
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1. Introduction
Computational humanities research—and thus computational humanities (CH) as a field—are
commonly associated or even equated with the use of quantitative methods. This seems to be
particularly true for computational research in history, typically referred to as digital history
or (less often) computational history.
As in the field of digital and computational humanities in general, there is no commonly
agreed upon definition of digital history; nevertheless, the term generally seems to subsume
two main orientations, which roughly align with either what Roth [31] calls digitized humanities,
which deal “essentially with the constitution, management, and processing of digitized archives,”
or with what he calls numerical humanities, focused on “mathematical abstraction and the
development of numerical and formal models” [31, p. 1].
The Wikipedia entry on digital history1 opens with a surprisingly concise definition: “Digital
history is the use of digital media to further historical analysis, presentation, and research. It
is a branch of the digital humanities and an extension of quantitative history, cliometrics, and
computing.” This definition can be understood to comprise both of these two orientations (and
the even wider area of “presentation”), but it views it primarily as “an extension of quantitative
history, cliometrics, and computing.”
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According to Decker [13, p. 12], “[t]he Digital History approach frequently includes digital
processing and storage of oral histories, images, or text.” Again, this is a relatively wide
definition, but the author then goes on to to stress the “heavy reliance on textual search and
analysis, especially of ‘Big Data’ (which can be roughly characterized for humanists as a body
of evidence too massive and/or complex for an individual to read),” and quantitative methods
such as topic modeling.
As a third example, Romein et al. [30, p. 293] does not understand digital history as
“a distinct discipline or field.” They regard digital history as a “signifier” under which
“historians experiment with tools, concepts and methods from other disciplines, including
computer science, and computational linguistics, to develop new perspectives on our past.”
While they also allude the ancestry of “quantitative history, often referred to as cliometrics,
where historians used mainframe computers for statistical analysis” [30, p. 292], the authors
clearly stress the import of “tools, concepts and methods from other disciplines” as a defining
characteristic.
In other words, the term digital history can be regarded as a common heading for two separate
approaches. The first, which is concerned with the uses of digital tools for presentation and
publication (to gain interactivity and nonlinearity), as well as for access (digitalization of and
access to sources and articles), is fully compatible with established qualitative methodologies.
The second approach, on the other hand, can be described as a return of the quantitative tools
from statistics re-imported through computer science [30, p. 294–295]. These computational
methods (such as topic modeling, computer vision, quantitative text analysis, or network
analysis) are primarily quantitative and tend to require “big data,” which is more or less
broadly construed “as a body of evidence too massive and/or complex for an individual to
read” [13, p. 12].
Decker [13, p. 8] also notes that it is notably this “quantitative element” of digital history,
which is “repellent to many historians and out of fashion in most fields of history, which rely
in the main on case studies and qualitative approaches of interpretation.” If, as he argues,
digital history embodies the “computational turn,” it is precisely the quantitative element that
stands in contrast to “the traditional norms of practice within the study of history” and thus
characterizes digital history both in outside perception and in significant parts of the field
itself.
For example, the first characteristic of computational humanities research mentioned in the
call for papers for this workshop is “relying on quantifiable rather than strictly qualitative
evidence.” Such focus is to be found on departmental Web sites of computational humanities
institutes or calls for papers throughout the discipline.2 The picture of computational
humanities that emerges through such presentation is thus that of a field primarily defined
by the application of a particular set of methods that are otherwise not used in the so-called
“traditional humanities,” or that of a toolbox providing scholars with shiny new tools.3
The way a discipline presents itself matters. The assumption that the humanities tradi-
tionally use exclusively qualitative, hermeneutic methods and that quantitative, “objective”
2For example, the call for InfDH 2020 workshop described computational humanities as “a new sub-area […],
which primarily aims at statistical and algorithmic methods of analysis in the humanities and cultural sciences,”
and asked for all submissions to stress the “quantitative, computer-based analysis of data from the humanities
and cultural sciences” (our translation).
3We share with McPherson [23] a certain discomfort with the use of the term “traditional” to describe
“non-computational” humanities scholars [see 23, p. 155, note 3] as it does not necessarily imply any of the
conventional meanings of the term.
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methods need to be brought in from the outside is widespread; it is reinforced, for example, by
interdisciplinary funding calls that assign the corresponding roles to researchers, insinuating
that the humanities are somehow defective—or at least outdated—in their supposed rejection
of the “new” methods of research, and that a transfer of methods from informatics4 (or perhaps
“data science”) to the humanities is urgently needed. In a Nature editorial from 2011 [3] we
read: “It seems just a matter of time before the humanities, like the social sciences before them,
wholeheartedly embrace scientific methodology. And that should be reason to rejoice, not
remonstrate.” We believe that this postulate is inaccurate and counterproductive. It rests on
two erroneous assumptions: first, the equation of informatics and quantitative methods; second,
the idea that CH consists in introducing these quantitative methods into the humanities.
There certainly are humanities scholars who are sceptical, not to say hostile, towards
quantitative methods. However, their presence is typically amplified in order to give substance
to the premise that quantitative methods are traditionally foreign to the humanities. They
are convincing because they tell the familiar story of stubborn traditionalists rejecting the
new ways, on principle, even though they are demonstrably superior. However, this narrative
completely ignores the long history of quantitative methods in the humanities and the related
methodological discourses. We read in a text written behind the Iron Curtain almost 70 and
translated into English almost 50 years ago: “When the historians came to realize that ‘they
had to count’—which occurred on a visible scale only during the last 50 years—quantitative
analyses became a legitimate element of historical narratives” [35, p. 483]. This approach is
then nothing new.5
Ultimately, the whole qualitative–quantitative dichotomy is fundamentally flawed and
unsuited to define computational humanities and its relationship to the humanities disciplines
and informatics. We would like to show this on the example of the disciplinary interface
between history and computational humanities. In the rest of this paper we first examine the
problems caused by ignoring the tradition of quantitative methods in historical research; we
then discuss the disciplinary implications and a possible way forward for applied computational
humanities; the final section summaries our conclusions.
2. The problem with the toolbox
In contrast to the common narrative, quantitative methods are anything but new in the
humanities; in fact, their use even predates computers. Quantitative methods started to
be introduced into historical research in the 19th century; this was primarily prompted by
the development of economic history (including demography) which, as Topolski [35, p. 484]
puts it, “if it was not to become a collection of anecdotes and curiosities, had to study
mass phenomena (by making use of sources which had not been studied previously), and
that required quantitative methods.” Notable examples include Frederick Jackson Turner’s
4The terms computer science (used in North America) and informatics (used in Europe) are often treated as
synonyms, and obviously they share a common core; however, the disciplinary and institutional structures differ
significantly. As this paper is written from a European perspective, we use the term informatics throughout;
note that the precise conception of informatics in Europe also varies between national academic systems (for an
extensive discussion of the terms and their history see Tedre [33] and, for the German development in particular,
Coy [12]).
5It also makes many people believe that what we have here is a dispute between young and old, junior and
senior scholars. In our experience, however, in the humanities the former often tend to be more “traditional”
(i.e., reluctant to use computational approaches) than the latter. This is due to a variety of factors, which we
cannot discuss here, but it shows that the fault line is not where the common narrative suggests.
173
demographical approach (exemplified by his 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier
in American History”), the work of the French Annales school before World War II, and
quantitative approaches to economic history with pioneers like Marczewski [22] in Europe
or Fogel [15] in the US; for a concise overview, see, for example, Anderson [1]. As soon as
computers became available to historians and massively expanded the practicability of large-
scale quantitative analyses, a methodological reflection on the new possibilities and the use of
quantitative methods in the new context started.
However, the results of this reflection were not, or only to a very limited extent, incorporated
into the field what we now call computational humanities. As Decker [13] notes, digital history
“retains a modest presence in the broader arena of Digital Humanities” and has not “rooted
itself in the academy among the professional guild of historians” either [13, p. 8]. It is likely
that this problem is at least in part due to a certain unease about how to integrate quantitative
methods into historical research, the association of quantitative approaches with positivism,
fears of “a dehumanization of history” [35, p. 488]. Maybe this is also due to the questions
raised by the new possibility of automating work that had been traditionally considered the
work of the historian and the quite justified fears of missing the effect of hidden biases that
come with it. Measured in the life-years of CH it is already a very old problem; it already figures
prominently in Bowles [7], one of the earliest publications dedicated to the use of computers
in the humanities.
The need for theory to precede any use of computers in historical research is also not new.
It was seen early on as a massive challenge to methodology; Bullough et al. [9, p. 402] stressed
that “[t]he implementation of effective computer programming relies […] on the articulation of
a formal coherent theory about the data processed.” Also very early on historians recognized
that the “unifying principle” of the various historical sub-fields defined by periods is not just
the method: “The common denominator of medievalists is a set of cultural data inherited from
a defined period rather than a method” [9, p. 392].
The more computing in the humanities became detached from specific research questions
in the humanities and turned into an independent field (humanities computing, digital
humanities, computational humanities), the weaker obviously became the links to discipline-
specific methodology. While the link to previous quantitative approaches is still quite strong in
the contributions to Bowles [7], as the projects still built to a large extent on pre-computer work,
it gets weaker over time as a result of a decreasing reception of the methodological reflection
in the humanities. Kenner [20, p. 362] already observes this disconnect in his review of the
1988 Humanities Computing Yearbook when he notes that “[a]t this moment, some humanities
computing seems to be in a state of free-fall. It’s tool-driven, a bad way to be. Better, be
situation-driven,” that is: driven by research questions. In other words: by choosing to ignore
the history of quantitative methods in the humanities, computational humanities has also come
to ignore most of the related methodological work previously done.6 While Scheinfeldt [32]
defends that it is a positive development of digital history that it “traffic[s] much less in new
theories than in new methods” [32, p. 125], it might be legitimate to fear that the field’s focus
on methods has won out over interpretations and argumentation [25, p. 2]. Current approaches
to digital history tend to separate methods and interpretation by borrowing the practice of
6Arguably CH largely ignores methodological work in the humanities, plain and simple. Then again, so do
large parts of the humanities.
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the quantitative sciences—and, as Ben Schmidt points out, thus in a way reproduce the split
between narrative and quantitative data of Time on the Cross.7
The excessive focus on methods as the defining element of computational humanities and
the disregard for methodology and theory incorrectly suggests that scholars could freely pick
their methods—which, as Mullen [25] points out, is obviously not the case. It also creates the
erroneous impression that computational humanities research primarily depends on data size.
This is obviously true if one restricts computational humanities to quantitative methods; as
William Aydelotte, a pioneer in applying statistics to historical research, pointed out, “formal
statistical presentations are appropriate only for a limited range of historical problems […] They
are gratuitous when the number of cases is small, and they are useless when the information is
too limited” [4, p. 8]. However, the disciplinary exchange between history and computational
humanities shows that there are valid research questions for CH regardless of the size of the
data, in particular in the domain of knowledge representation and reasoning; for pioneering
work in this sense in archeology and history see Gardin [17] and Borillo [6].
The application of quantitative methods also does not simply solve previously unsolved
historical questions; suggesting this overlooks their true complexity and only encourages
simplistic approaches along the lines of culturomics [24]. Given that “humanities data” is in
many respects fundamentally different from “big data”—the natural domain of data science—
it is necessarily problematic when data scientists dabble in the humanities. The results may
seem convincing at first (especially when they are supported by impressive visualizations), but
they rarely hold up to closer scrutiny—if only because the provenance and composition of the
underlying data are unclear and the stability of the relationships established is hence unknown.
Already the Soviet humanities computing pioneer Ivan Kovalchenko underscored that “[t]he
quantitative methods are not a key to absolute truth that is going to render qualitative research
meaningless nor are they only applicable in ‘mass-data’ situations” [21], and Aydelotte noted
that “[t]he significance of a project of historical research depends not on whether or not it
is quantitative but upon the importance of the problem, the extent of the evidence, and the
intelligence with which the research is executed” [4, p. 8].
Historians grappled with the problems posed by large amounts of (not necessarily reliable)
data already back in the days of cybernetics and introduced the distinct category of “mass data”
[2]. But while it signaled the problem, it did not solve it. They also intuitively understood
early on that the use of computers will allow for a vastly expanded source base, but that it
will only be profitable if “goals and strategies are carefully planned and designed” and if the
research will involve testing “explicitly formulated hypotheses […] that are guided by theoretical
considerations” [11, p. 605], i.e., going well beyond mined correlations followed by post hoc
interpretations.
The portrayal of computational humanities as merely a set of (primarily quantitative)
methods is doubly problematic from a disciplinary-institutional perspective. The view of
computational humanities as a “toolbox” undermines the establishment of theoretical CH8
as a discipline in its own right, which is necessary for its longer-term survival; at the same
time it raises the question how applied CH differs from quantitative history, supposedly
revealing that applied CH is nothing but “warmed up” quantitative approaches, which have
supposedly been overcome a long time ago. Unlike CH, the humanities disciplines very much
7Ben Schmidt: “Two Volumes: the lessons of Time on the Cross”.
8We follow Piotrowski [27] in the distinction between applied and theoretical computational humanities: the
former being subfields of their respective mother disciplines, the latter a kind of applied informatics.
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have an institutional memory of previous “turns.” This memory is often heavily distorted
by discourses that label works associated with preceding turns as outdated, if not fallacious.
But to learn from that memory is a crucial skill. For example, by unduly assuming that
quantitative methods on their own can provide a supposedly objective view, Fogel and
Engerman’s study of the economics of slavery, Time on the Cross [16], created a distorted
picture of the past [18]. Moreover, they committed the original “toolbox error” when they
defined the methodological framework of their study, they combined a belief in the objectivity
of their quantitative tools with implicit assumptions from the field of economics, in line with
the cliometric application of “standard economic reasoning in the posing and answering of
historical questions” [5]. The controversy following the publication of the book associated
the methodology in general with the shortcomings of this study in particular, leading to a
widespread dismissal of quantitative and computational historical approaches in North America
[34, 37]. Mistaking quantitative methods as a panacea for any limitations of qualitative
approaches endangers the whole methodology. Naïvely putting quantitative methods (now
in the guise of computational humanities) forward as “the next big thing,” only reinforces the
supposed qualitative–quantitative dichotomy and leads to a vicious circle of fruitless arguments.
While both the pioneers of computational humanities and historians saw not only those
problems but also the need to tackle them on a theoretical level, no wide-reaching theoretical
foundation has been built so far. Computational humanities seems to sometimes mistake the
intuitive understanding of those problems in humanities in general and history in particular
as a lack of methodological reflection. While this reflection was sometimes haphazard, it is
very much part of the histories of digital and computational humanities. There is also another
issue here: that of terminology. If digital and computational humanities are conceptualized
as occupying the grounds between informatics and the humanities, it is important that they
realize that different languages are spoken on either side. What is called “theory” in informatics,
frequently more closely resembles what is called “methodology” in the humanities, where
“theory” is often associated with schools of thought. This leads computational humanities, so
to speak, to look in the wrong place for reflections on quantitative methods and corresponding
theory in the humanities.9 After all, the “use of quantitative material by historians is neither
a new nor revolutionary development” ([11, p. 602]; [but see also 22]; [36]; [14]).
3. No history without history
The application of quantitative computational methods in history (and in the humanities in
general) requires a solid methodological basis—but so does any method. The goal of the
preceding section was not to warn of the dangers of an unreflected or inappropriate use
of quantitative methods (already the pioneers heeded these dangers); we rather wanted to
draw attention to the simplistic understanding of computational humanities as “toolbox” of
(quantitative) methods and the correlated disconnect from disciplinary methodology. In other
words: the warnings of the pioneers in quantitative history are largely unknown in CH precisely
because CH is not conceived as being in the methodological tradition of history (or whatever
the relevant humanities discipline may be).
The view of CH as a “toolbox” poses a danger to the sustainability of CH as a research
program because it perfectly fits the narrative of the “digital turn”—and as the history of the
9Scheinfeldt’s above-quoted delight in digital history’s preference of “new methods” over “new theories” [32,
p. 125] also seems at least in part due to this confusion.
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humanities demonstrates, these “turns” tend to be more akin to short-lived fashions rather than
to profound methodological transformations. Lasting change requires institutional change; in
academia, change is institutionalized via structures that in some way correspond to disciplines.
While digital humanities in its various forms has certainly made inroads, we warn that many
structures are less stable than they may appear [27]; Decker [13, p. 12] also notes this as “a
certain weakness.” He adds that “[d]isciplines by their nature have boundaries, and without
such fences, Digital History cannot really develop the sorts of professional norms and functions
that define other history fields.” The question of whether or not CH is a discipline is therefore
not an idle question. How to proceed then?
As we have pointed out before [28], disciplines are not defined by the methods they use, but
by the research objects they study and the research questions they aim to answer. Methods are
secondary and contingent on the unique combination of research object and research questions
that define a discipline. This already restricts to some extent which parts or orientations of
CH could possibly be considered a discipline; it also helps to delimit CH from neighboring
disciplines.
If we examine computational humanities research (in the sense of Piotrowski [27], i.e.,
excluding research that is not concerned with the construction of computational models
or meta-models) we find that some of the work is primarily concerned with humanities
research objects (e.g., historical phenomena) and corresponding research questions (e.g., causes
and effects of these phenomena), while another part of the research is primarily concerned
with informatics research objects (e.g., algorithms) and corresponding research questions
(e.g., effectiveness and efficiency of these algorithms). The distinction between applied and
theoretical computational humanities proposed by Piotrowski [27] reflects these two main
orientations. This is obviously an idealization, but it helps to clarify the research objects
and research questions, as well as the larger disciplinary context (e.g., funding opportunities or
evaluation criteria) required for long-term sustainability of the field, which in turn determines
the career opportunities of early-stage researchers: applied CH thus describes subfields in the
humanities disciplines, whereas theoretical CH can be considered a kind of applied informatics.
Applied CH (or “computational X” for some mother discipline X) consequently must be
placed in the methodological tradition of the discipline. Thus, we posit that computational
history must be conceptualized as being (partly) in the methodological tradition of quantitative
and cybernetic [e.g., 10] approaches to history, but also in the larger methodological scope of
history. This concerns both the methodological foundations and the lessons learned, which
would be foolish to ignore—this is, however, the obvious and very real risk when considering
CH as a toolbox of “objective” methods outside the methodological traditions of the humanities.
In other words: you cannot do history without history.
4. Conclusion
We have shown that the use of quantitative methods in the humanities—both in the sense of
“un po’ di aritmetica” [26, p. 114] as well as in the sense of large-scale statistical analyses—is
far from new; it even predates computers. The interest in quantitative approaches in history
certainly seems to follow a boom and bust cycle—see, for example, the analysis by Buchner
et al. [8] of the use of quantitative methods by German historians from 1951 to 2016. Their
applicability obviously also varies by discipline, for example in archaeology, as in linguistics,
they have long become a firmly established part of both praxis and training. In any case, the
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assumption that the humanities traditionally use exclusively qualitative, hermeneutic methods
and that quantitative, “objective” methods need to be brought in from the outside is, simply
put, wrong.
The fact that the humanities have already worked—and struggled—with quantitative meth-
ods for a long time means that they have also made their own mistakes with them and (at least
to some extent) learned their lessons, independently from digital and computational humanities.
The misrepresentation of research methods in the humanities is already counterproductive on
its own, but the main problem, we believe, is the unwarranted focus on methods as defining
characteristic of applied computational humanities. It suggests that researchers can freely pick
their methods, irrespective of the research object and the research question—and insinuates
that humanities scholars simply refuse to use supposedly superior quantitative methods. But
even more importantly, it places applied computational humanities outside the methodological
scope and traditions of their mother disciplines.
It is clear that the methods to be used first and foremost must be adequate for the research
object and the research question—in itself hardly a revolutionary, but still mostly intuitively
understood principle. Our main point is, however, not to warn against the use of inappropriate
methods. In this respect the reflection on methodological coexistence in the humanities is very
helpful as it makes it clear that the dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative methods
is fundamentally flawed. They do not stand in opposition to each other and a choice of an
appropriate method depends on the research problem and not on the affiliation with a particular
discipline, or as Kovalchenko put it: “any sphere of mathematics is only a means of knowledge,
one of the methods of the discovery of the internal nature and qualitative uniqueness of the
object of study” [quoted in 29, p. 25]. Topolski was certainly correct when he predicted almost
50 years ago that “the quantitative approach will on an increasing scale serve the improvement
of qualitative analyses,” but that “the qualitative approach cannot be eliminated from historical
studies,” because, after all, “why do we collect and classify numerical data if not to obtain
answers to specific questions?” [35, p. 484]. Whether in science, engineering, or the humanities:
“The purpose of computing is insight, not numbers” [19, p. vii].
We rather want to warn against conceptualizing computational humanities as merely a
“toolbox” of quantitative methods. Disciplines are not defined by the methods they use, but
by the research objects they study and the research questions they aim to answer—by the
research capital they work with. In order to arrive at a coherent conception, we believe it is
crucial to distinguish between applied and theoretical computational humanities, as proposed
by Piotrowski [27]. Applied computational humanities must then be firmly placed in the
methodological scope and tradition of their mother disciplines—which is why it might be more
appropriate to refer to them as “computational history,” “computational literary studies,” and
so on, as they are aiming to answer why? questions in the humanities, whereas theoretical
computational humanities is concerned with the corresponding how? questions in informatics.
This distinction does not imply a strict separation—on the contrary: we believe it provides
a much better foundation for computational (and not just quantitative) modeling in the
humanities that is adequate with respect to both the humanities and informatics.
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